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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appel/ant,
vs.
RAEDEL E. ASHLEY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
GARY MONTGOMERY, et al.,
Plain tiffs-Appel/an ts,
vs.
JOHN DOE 1-5, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and

Case No.
12123

GRAND CENTRAL, INC., a corporation,
Intervenor,
GARY MONTGOMERY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
A.B. COOPER, dba KEARNS IGA FOODLINER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS GARY MONTGOMERY, ALAN K. JEPPESEN,
RICHARD HARRINGTON, HENRY SKIDMORE and GARY L. PAXTON.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a consolidation of three actions brought in the
District Court of Salt Lake County under Chapter 25, Laws
of Utah 1970, commonly referred to as the "Common Day
of Rest Act." (hereinafter the "Act"). Case No. 192780 was
brought by plaintiff Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. against defendant individuals and corporations operating licensed pharmacies in Salt Lake County, and seeks a temporary and per1

manent injunction restraining said defendants from violating
the Act and damages against defendants for violating the Act
during the pendency of the action. Case No. 192886 was
brought by plaintiffs Gary Montgomery, Alan K. Jeppesen,
Richard Harrington, Henry Skidmore, Gary L. Paxton and
Larry R. Keller, as private individuals, and Case No. 192948
was brought by Gary Montgomery, as a private individual,
against defendants operating places of business in Salt Lake
County. These two cases seek a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from violating the Act.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In a consolidated hearing limited to the question of
constitutionality, Judge Leonard W. Elton, in an oral decision from the bench on May 12, 1970, held that the
Utah Common Day of Rest Act, Chapter 25, Laws of Utah
1970 was, "in its entirety," in violation of the Constitution
of Utah. No grounds were given for this decision. In an
Order of Dismissal entered May 18, 1970, defendants'
various Motions for Dismissal and Motions for Summary
Judgment were granted and the consolidated actions were
dismissed with prejudice. This appeal is prosecuted from
that order.
RELIEF SOUGHT TO APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the order of the lower court
reversed and the Common Day of Rest Act declared constitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. The only facts before the
Court were stipulated between all the parties hereto, which
stipulation has been mcluded in the Record on Appeal.
Immediately prior to the hearing below, all parties hereto,
both plaintiffs and defendants, stipulated in open court
that the question of constitutionality was ripe for decision.
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On Sunday, l\pril 5, 1970, in Case No. 192780, individuals shopped and made purchases at stores named as
defendants, all of which were open to the public and conducted and operated in the usual manner and location. Defendants are all individuals or corporations operating businesses for profit, containing a licensed pharmacy on the
premises and selling items at retail to members of the
public in competition with the business operated by plaintiff Skaggs.
On Sunday, April 5, 1970, in Case No. 192886 the
individual plaintiffs shopped at defendant stores and made
purchases named in that complaint. None of the stores so
named had filed a notice of intent to remain closed on
Saturday.
On Sunday, April 12, 1970, in Case No. 192948 individual plaintiff Montgomery, shopped at defendant stores
and made purchases named in that complaint. None of the
stores so named had filed a notice of intent to close on
Saturday.
ARGUMENT
In view of the absence of any opinion or other official
indication of the basis for the decision of the lower court, the
points made herein are based upon the primary lines of argument raised by Appellees against the constitutionality of the
Act in the lower court argument.
I. MATTERS OF SOCIAL POLICY RELATING TO
THE SUBJECT STATUTE DO NOT AFFECT CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
Such strong language has been used by the Utah Supreme Court in characterizing the judicial role that, paradoxically, some of the most significant principles at stake in a
constitutional determination may appear to be mere platitudes. The temptation to treat such statements of principle
as platitudes and to infringe upon the legislative role may
seem attractive to a court that disagrees with the policy of a
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statute. Traditionally, however, the Utah Supreme Court has
been a model of judicial propriety in this respect. A few
sample phrases from a recent opinion of the Utah Court on
the subject of constitutionality state without equivocation
the principles that must be kept in mind in the subject action:1
[T] he legislature of the state is not a government of
powers limited to those expressly granted, as is the
federal government .... The legislature of the state,
which represents the people and thus the sovereign,
has all of the residuum of power of government, except only as expressly restricted by the constitution.
In order to preserve the independence and integrity
of the three branches of government, it is of the utmost importance that the judicial (branch] exercise
restraint and not intrude into the legislative prerogative. It cannot strike down and nullify a legislative
enactment unless it is clearly and expressly prohibited
by the Constitution or in violation of some plain
mandate thereof. The court must make every reasonable presumption which favors constitutionality. The
courts have a duty to investigate and, insofar as possible, discover any reasonable avenues by which the
statute can be upheld. Every reasonable doubt must
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the
statute. Those who assert the invalidity of the statute
must bear the burden of showing it to be unconsitutional.
It does not lie within the province of the court to
pass upon the wisdom, the need or the desirability of
any legislation, nor to choose between two opposing
political philosophies. It is not the function of the
court to ameliorate the conditions of those in want,
nor is its purpose to solve the economic, social or
religious problems and dissentions which beset society. The court is not the conscience of the State or its
lTrade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 446 P.2d 958 (Utah,
1968) (emphasis
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people. It does not fall within its duty to express the
personal desires or philosophy of its personnel.
The court must voluntarily restrain itself by holding
strictly to an exercise and expression of its delegated
or innate power to interpret and adjudicate. We have
been called upon to state what the law is and not
what we think it should be. The question as to whether the statute in question is or is not economically
sound or beneficial is not for the court to decide, but
such an inquiry is a matter for the legislature. The
only question for us is to determine whether or not
the particular statute in question is constitutional.
If, based upon the facts of this case, any one of the
lower court's conclusions is inevitable, then its judgment must be sustained, but if a different determination can be reasonably and fairly reached in each instance then the matter is tentative and should be decided on what could be a varied conclusion.

In defining economic offenses there may be latitude
in setting up the exact nature of the prohibited acts.
In another recent case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The statute should not be striken down nor applied
other than in accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or confused as to be wholly beyond reason or inoperable, or it contravenes some
basic constitutional right. If it meets these tests, it is
not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom, or
its effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or orderliness of the procedure set forth, but it has a duty to
2
let it operate as the legislature has provided.
In making such statements, the Utah Court has echoed the
language of federal and state courts throughout the country,
as suggested by these classic phrases from Mr. Justice
Murphy:
2Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah, 1967) (emphasis
added).
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Looking through the form of this plea to its essential
basis, we cannot fail to recognize it as an argument
for invalidity because this court disagrees with the
desirability of the legislation. We rehearse the obvious
when we say that our function is thus misconceived.
We are not equipped to decide desirability; and a
court cannot eliminate measures which do not happen to suit its tastes if it seeks to maintain a democrative system. 3
The social policy desired by the citizens of the State of
Utah on the subject of Sunday Closing has been clearly and
consistently expressed. The first Utah statute, struck down in
Broadbent v. Gibson in 1943, 4 had been in effect for 45
years. (The constitutional defects of the statute at issue in
that case have been overcome by the subject statute, as indicated elsewhere in this brief.) Beginning in 1953, the Utah
legislature has enacted by large majorities in both Houses at
least four Sunday Closing statutes which have been vetoed by
Governors of the State, primarily upon policy grounds. The
subject statute, passed early in 1970, was not vetoed, after
the Governor had received an opinion from the Utah Attorney General that the subject statute was constitutional. 5 A
short time prior to introduction of the subject bill into the
1970 legislature, a public opinion survey conducted in Salt
Lake County by staff members of the Department of Sociology at the University of Utah found that 51 per cent of
those surveyed favored legal restrictions on businesses opening on Sundays. Forty-one per cent of those surveyed did not
favor such restrictions and the remaining 8 percent had no
opinion. 6
3naniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Company, 336 U.S. 220,224
(1949) (emphasis added).
4140 P.2d 939 (Utah, 1943).
5January 24, 1970, Dear Governor Rampton: Re: Sunday Closing Law. I
am writing to you to advise you that the enclosed Act has been studied by this
office relative to the question of its constitutionality. It is our conclusion that the
proposed bill does meet the constitutional standards for such legislation as set
forth by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and our own Supreme
Court if the exception relative to the sale of real estate is eliminated. It is my
understanding that the sponsors are agreeable to having that portion of the law
deleted by amendment. If you have any further question concerning this matter,
please let me know. Yours trulv, Robert B. Hansen, Deputy Attorney General.
6shumway and Smith, Citizen Attitude Survey on Sunday Employment in
Salt Lake County, Utah, January, 1970.
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With this background, the Utah legislature made certain
factual findings in setting forth the purpose and policy expressed in Section 1 of the 1970 Utah Common Day of Rest
Act. Thus, the branch of the state government whose function it is to decide such matters has made clear its conclusions concerning the social policies involved in the instant
case.
Appellants are acutely aware of the differences of opin10n concerning the philosophical desirability of Sunday
Closing legislation. Appellants are further aware of the argument made in the lower court by Respondents that a Sunday
Closing law in Utah in this modern era is neither realistic nor
socially desirable. Appellants respectfully submit that these
philosophical conclusions are at the heart of Respondents'
case, but must point out to the Court a principle stated not
long ago by the Ohio Supreme Court:
Whether in this fast-moving modern age the Sunday
closing law is outmoded, obsolete and unrealistic and
should be eradicated is essentially a legislative and not
a judicial problem. 7
II. THE "SUNDAY CLOSING CASES" DECIDED BY
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN 1961 ESTABLISH SIGNIFICANTLY PERSUASIVE PRECEDENT APPLICABLE IN
THE INST ANT CASE.
The 1961 decisions of the United States Supreme Court
upholding the consitituional validity of various kinds of Sunday Closing laws (the "Sunday Closing Cases") 8 have effectively laid to rest the kinds of arguments made by the Respondents in the lower court. The highly persuasive, if not
authoritative, effect of these decisions has been generally
recognized by State courts, in spite of arguments that the
Supreme Court was dealing with Federal rather than State
constitutional provisions. Note, for example, this language:
... the opinions of the Supreme Court in the above
cited cases, to which we shall adhere, competely re7state v. Kidd, 150 N.E.2d 413, 419 (Ohio, 1958).
8 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and accompanying cases.
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fute the contentions that our Kentucky statute violates constitutional guaranties and prohibitions with
respect to religion, that the statute is not a proper
exercise of the police power, and that the exemptions
are such as to make the statute discriminatory or arbitrary or violative of the right to equal protection of
the law .9
Appellants grant that, technically, these cases are not binding
authority upon State courts; however, the fact that they deal
thoroughly and conclusively with every argument advanced
by Respondents is not to be taken lightly, much less ignored.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "the argument might
seem more potent had it not been answered by the highest
court in our land. " 1 0
On other occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has found
that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court under Federal con::;titutional provisions are "highly persuasive" regarding the
application of similar clauses in the State Constitution. 11
Other Courts have also followed the rule that where the language of the state constitution is similar to that of the Federal Constitution, the language of the state constitutional
provision should receive the same definition and interpretation as that which has been given to a like provision in the
Federal Constitution by the United States Supreme Court. 1 2
The question may arise whether the State constitutional
provisions to be considered by the Court in the instant case
are similar to those of the Federal Constitution. It is submitted by Appellants that, with respect to the two primary
arguments advanced by the Respondents in the lower court,
the Federal and State provisions are essentially the same. The
first of these arguments was that of vagueness, which is a
matter of due process. The Utah Supreme Court has always
9commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 357 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ky., 1962).
Accord, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 175 N.E.2d 486 (Mass., 1961);
State v. Karmil Merchandising Corp., 186 A.2d 352 (MP., 1962); Charles Stores
Co., Inc. v. Tucker, 140 S.E.2d 370 (N.C., 1965); State v. MontelPone, 175 A.2d
207 (N.J., 1961), Mandell v. Haddon, 121 S.E.2d 516 (Va., 1961).
l01n re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 901(Utah,1955).
lluntermyer v. State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah, 1942).
12city of Tacoma v. Heater, 409 P.2d 867, 869 (Wash., 1966).
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recognized that the Federal and State constitutional provisions dealing with the due process clauses are "substantially
similar", such that "it is proper for us to look to the Federal
adjudications as helpful and persuasive in the interpretation
of our provisions. " 1 3
The second primary argument advanced by the Respondents was that the subject statute is discriminatory. This
argument calls for interpretation of the equal protection
clause under the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution,
which requires that all laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation. Appellants have been unable to find any
Utah case in which any difference between the Federal and
State tests for equality or uniformity has been expressed.
Moreover, the California Supreme Court, in interpreting a
California constitutional provision virtually identical in language to Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, has
observed that, "these provisions of our State Constitution
have been generally thought in California to be substantially
the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment. " 1 4 In an earlier case, the California Supreme
Court had stated that:
It is clear that the test for determining the validity

of a statute where a claim is made that it unlawfully
discriminates against any class is substantially the
same under the state prohibitions against special legislation and the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution. 1 5
Specifically in connection with Sunday Closing legislation,
the Utah Supreme Court has consistently cited federal authorities in establishing the test to be applied in evaluating
the equal protection or discrimination arguments raised in
prior Sunday Closing Cases. For example, in Broadbent v.
Gibson, 16 the Court stated the basic reasonableness test for
13General Electric Company v. Thrify Sales, Inc., 301 P.2d 741, 745
(Utah, 1956).
14oepartment of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 400 P.2d 321, 322
(Calif., 1965).
15Los Angeles County v. Southern California Telephone Company, 196
P.2d 773, 781(Calif.,1948).
16140 P.2d 939, 944 (Utah, 1943).
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evaluating discrimination and cited, among other authorities,
the landmark federal equal protection case of Nebbia v. New
York. 1 7 In addition, in Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 1 8 the
Utah court cited as the primary rule to be applied certain
language from 12 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law S 521, which
discusses the equal protection and uniformity tests at length
with no distinction between federal and state constitutional
provisions. In fact, the primary authority cited in that reference consists of federal cases. It is submitted that there is no
meaningful difference between the federal and state tests to
be applied in the instant case in dealing with the central
arguments of the Respondents.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of 1961 must
be given the most serious consideration by the Court.
Nevertheless, as shown elsewhere in this brief, the subject statute meets the applicable tests established by the Utah
Supreme Court, without regard to the federal Sunday Closing
Cases. That Appellants cite language from the federal cases
should not be construed to mean that Appellants' position is
dependent upon those cases; rather, such citations are offered
in view of the recognition in earlier cases by the Utah Supreme Court that pronouncements of the highest court in the
land interpreting state constitutional provisions substantially
similar to the federal provisions are, at the very least, "highly
persuasive".
III. THE ACT IS NOT A LAW RESPECTING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION OR PROHIBITING THE
FREE EXERCISE THEREOF.
A. Sunday Closing not an establishment of religion. It is
no longer open to serious constitutional question whether
Sunday Closing Laws are laws "respecting an establishment
of religion" in violation of the federal or state constitutions.
In the Sunday Closing Cases of 1961 1 9 the U.S. Supreme
Court dealt with this question conclusively in a series of exhaustive opinions. Noting that "almost every State in our
17291 U.S. 502 (1934).
18194 P.2d 464, 46fi (Utah, 1948).
19McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and accompanying cases.
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Country presently has some type of Sunday regulation and
over 40 possess a relatively comprehensive system, " 2 0 the
Court reviewed the historical background of Sunday Closing
legislation and evaluated its social objectives to conclude that
today's typical Sunday Closing Laws have valid and desirable
secular purposes unrelated to religion. The Utah Supreme
Court had reached this same conclusion without hesitation in
Broadbent v. Gibson. 21
B. The Act does not prohibit the free exercise of religion by persons who consider Saturday as their Sabbath. Section 5( 5) of the Act sets forth an exemption from the general
Sunday Closing provisions for those who elect to close on
Saturday. In two of the 1961 cases, 2 2 the Supreme Court
held that Sunday Closing Laws were constitutional even if
they did not exempt persons whose religious beliefs required
them to abstain from business on another day. The Court
pointed out, however, that of the thirty-four states having
Sunday Closing Laws, twenty-one then had such an exemption and the majority opinion stated that the exemption
"may well be the wiser solution to the problem. " 2 3 In the
more recent case of Sherbert v. Vemer, 24 the Supreme Court
held that a State could not deny unemployment compensation to a person who could not obtain a job because she
refused to work on Saturday because of religious convictions.
Although the majority opinion attempted to distinguish
Braunfeld v. Brown, Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent suggested
that the Court's decision rejected the reasoning of Braunfeld. 2 5 This indication that the Court may take a different
view of Braunfeld today suggests that a Sunday Closing statute should contain a Sabbatarian exemption to be protected
against the claim that it prohibits the free exercise of religion.
The Utah Act is free from that claim in that it contains a
Saturday option.
It should be noted from Section 1 of the Act that the
:W1d. at 435.
21140 P.2d 939 (Utah, 1943).
22Braunfeld v. Brow"n, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
23Braunfeld v. Brown, Id. at 608.
24374 U.S. 398 (1963).
251d. at 418.
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purpose of the Saturday option is to protect those who observe Saturday as their Sabbath, although no religious observance test is required. This approach also protects the Statute
against the argument that it requires inquiry into the good
faith of the religious belief of those seeking the Saturday
option. For a helpful discussion of the constitutional wisdom
of a Saturday option of the type contained in the Act, see
the notes to a proposed model Common Day of Rest Act
published in 3 Harvard Journal on Legislation, 345, 350-54
(1965-66).
C. The Saturday option does not impair the purposes of
a Common Day of Rest Act. A Saturday option is included in
the Sunday Closing statutes in Texas and Minnesota. Both
statutes have been tested in the Supreme Courts of the respective States, where it has been argued that such statutes
do not establish a uniform day of rest. In rejecting this argument, i;he Minnesota Court stated that the Saturday option
was an
attempt to alleviate the indirect religious burden
upon Sabbatarians by granting those merchants a restriction-free Sunday if they close on Saturday, while
at the same time requiring no religious declaration for
the exercise of that right. It may not be a perfect
solution to a complex problem, but we must conclude that the statute is not constitutionally defective
on that ground. 26
Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court recently concluded that
the Saturday option would not affect the constitutionality of
the Texas statute based on reasoning similar to that of the
Minnesota Court. The Texas Court observed, "the Legislature
was entitled to expect that [the Saturday option] would
yield Sunday operations only by Sabbatarians and perhaps an
occasional small storekeeper. " 2 7 It should be noted that on
appeal of this Texas decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
appeal was denied for want of a substantial Federal question
on April 20, 1970. It would appear, in light of these authorities and the circumstances surrounding the Saturday option
26state v. Target Stores, Inc., 156 N.W.2d 908, 916-17 (Minn., 1968).
27state v. Spartan's Industries, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407 (Tex., 1969), appeal
denied,
U.S.
, 25 L.Fd.2d 596 (1970).
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in the Act, that this provision does not impair the purposes
of a uniform day of rest.
IV. THE ACT IS NOT UNREASONABLY DISCRIMINATORY BECAUSE ITS CLASSIFICATIONS RELATE
REASONABLY TO THE PURPOSES OF THE LEGISLATION.
It has been argued that the Act violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24, which
requires that all laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation. The test to be applied in dealing with any objection to a Sunday Closing law on these grounds was set forth
by the Utah Supreme Court in Broadbent v. Gibson, where
the Court stated:

[D] iscrimination is the very essence of classification
and is not objectionable unless founded upon distinctions which the Court is compelled to find unreasonable .... The Legislature has a wide discretion in
determining what should come within the class of
permitted activities and what shall be excluded ....
'A court is not concerned with the policy of the law
and cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
legislative body. If reasonable minds might differ as
to the reasonableness of the regulation, the law must
be upheld. ' 2 8
This language echoed the broader statement of the first
Sunday Closing case to come before the Utah Supreme Court
in 1903 2 9 where the Court stated that Sunday Closing laws
"are so 'uniformly upheld ... as a legitimate exercise of the
police power of a state that it is unnecessary to cite or discuss
authority in support thereof." The Court further declared
that
[A] 11 presumptions are in favor of the validity of a
statute, and unless the courts can clearly say that the
28140 P.2d 939, 944 (emphasis added).
29state v. Sopher, 71 Pac. 482 (Utah, 1903).
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legislature has erred, the act should stand, and the
prerogatives of the legislature not encroached upon.
Courts may interpret, construe, declare, md apply
the law, but may not usurp the function of the lawmaking power by assuming to interfere with or control legislative discretion.
The Broadbent Court cited as authority for its test
Nebbia v. New York, 3 0 which established the basic rule since
recognized generally by State and Federal Courts that governmental regulation of business affairs (as distinguished from
regulation of fundamental personal rights and non-business
special legislation under some state constitutions) may not be
struck down on a discrimination theory unless it conclusively
appears that the Legislature had no reasonable basis for its
action. 31
The two primary cases that have applied the reasonableness test to Sunday Closing legislation in Utah are Broadbent
v. Gibson 3 2 and Gronlund v. Salt Lake City. 3 3 In the Broadbent case, the Court classified the various types of Sunday
Closing statutes into three categories: ( 1) "commodity" statutes, (2) statutes closing only a particular business on Sunday, and ( 3) closing statutes which exempt certain retail businesses or occupations. The Court found that the Broadbent
statute fit into the third of these categories because it exempted from its general closing provisions such businesses as
bakeries, garages, pharmacies and other retail businesses. The
Court found the statute unconstitutional because it discriminated between "persons or firms similarly situated." For example, the Court noted, "confectionery stores may keep
open under the statues to sell soft drinks and confections;
grocery stores which sell the same items must close. " 3 4 The
Court found this same aspect of the statute troublesome in
30291 U.S. 502 (1934).
3lsee also Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement, 246 P.2d 591, Ci97
(Utah, 1952), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated: "An act is never unconstitutional because of discrimination so long as there is some reasonable basis for
differentiation between classes which is related tu the purposes to be accom·
plished bv the act." (emphasis adde<l.)
32140 P.2d. 939 (Utah, 1943).
33194 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1948).
34supra, Note 32, at 946.
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considering the state-wide application of the law because in
many communities in the State confectionery or pharmacy
kinds of commodities were sold by general stores rather than
the confectionery stores and pharmacies exempted under the
statute. Obviously, if the exemptions from the closing provisions of the statute had applied to the sale of certain commodities rather than the opening of certain businesses, none
of these difficulties would have arisen. Thus, the Court noted
early in its opinion that a statue with commodity exemptions
"is almost uniformly unheld" since "anyone can sell any of
the exempted commodities .... " 3 5 The rule of Broadbent v.
Gibson, therefore is that a Sunday Closing statute may not
discriminate between retail merchandising firms selling the
same kinds of products.
It is of material significance to note that the Act
presently before the Court exempts commodities and services
rather than specific retail businesses. Hence, it is a "commodity" Sunday Closing Law which the Broadbent Court stated
as being "almost uniformly upheld." In support of this rule,
it has been noted in an annotation dealing with discrimination cases arising under Sunday Closing Laws that "enactments discriminating between different types of commodities" have "usually been held valid." 36

The other Utah case in point is Gronlund v. Salt Lake
City. 3 7 That case found invalid a Salt Lake City ordinance
which prohibited mercantile selling only. The Court cited
Broadbent v. Gibson and observed in stating the rules applicable to the case that "the constitutionality of general Sunday closing laws is no longer to be doubted." 3 8 The Court
then addressed itself to the provisions of the ordinance as
follows:
First to be noted is that it is not a general Sunday
closing law in the sense that it prohibits the performance of labor and the pursuit of gainful occupation
- works of charity and necessity excepted - on Sun351d. at 944 (emphasis added).
36Annotation, 57 A.L.R.2d 977, 979 (1956).
37194 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1948).
381d. at 466 (emphasis added).
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day. It has reference only to mercantile pursuits, indirectly limiting those pursuits by preventing the sale
on that day of all commodities with specified exceptions. 3 9
The Court then expressed its concern that to prohibit the
working of a salesman while permitting the employment of a
common laborer did not further the purpose of the act, that
of protecting society by establishing a compulsory day of
rest. The Court further stated that the Broadbent rule validating commodity statutes did not apply to the ordinance in
question because the ordinance was not a general Sunday
Closing law. The Gronlund Court made this point very clear
by expressly distinguishing between the Salt Lake City retail
selling ordinance on the one hand and the general Sunday
Closing laws with commodity exceptions that had been cited
in Broadbent as the "type of statute" that "is almost uniformly upheld." The failure of the Gronlund ordinance to
provide for general closing as distinguished from retail closing
formed the basis for the Court's holding:
In view of what we have said hereinabove as to the
ordinance not being a general Sunday closing law designed to accomplish the purposes it purports to effect, we shall devote little space to the argument
made as to discrimination between the sale of commodities. 4 0
It should also be noted that the Court in Gronlund reiterated a point made in Broadbent that a Sunday Closing
statute must exempt works of necessity .4 1 Thus, the rule of
Gronlund is that a valid Sunday Closing law must be general
in the sense that it prohibits the performance of labor and
"gainful occuptions" generally (works of charity and necessity excepted) rather than merely prohibiting retail selling.

In establishing that rule, Gronlund is consistent with
several other recent State cases. Appellants have carefully
reviewed every State Sunday Closing Case decided since
391bid.
401ct. at 468.
411ct. at 467.
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1957, and have discovered that no State statute or ordinance
has been found unconstitutional on grounds of discrimination if it was a general closing law. Of more than thirty
State appellate decisions since 1957, only eight cases have
found the statute or ordinance involved unconstitutionally
discriminatory. Without exception, these eight cases dealt
with non-general closing provisions. These cases are as follows:

1. Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543 (Fla., 1960)
(statute discriminatory because it regulated automobile sales
only).
2. Hughes v. Reynolds, 157 S.E.2d 746 (Ga., 1967) (retail closing statute discriminatory because various businesses
indiscriminately excepted; also an exception if prohibited
items not more than 50 per cent of sales volume).
3. Boyer v. Ferguson, 389 P.2d 775 (Kans., 1964) (retail selling ordinance unconstitutionally discriminatory because of exception for small grocery stores and broad exception for stores selling items pertaining to repair and maintenance of farm equipment).
4. West v. Winnsboro, 211 So.2d 665 (La., 1968) (ordinance invalidated which regulated grocery stores only with
exemptions for small stores).
5. Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475
(Nebr., 1964) (invalid statute regulated retail selling only;
court expressly concerned that only retailers were affected
and that small stores were exempt).
6. Skag-way Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Grand Island, 125
N .W .2d 529 (Nebr., l 964)(invalid ordinance regulated retail
selling only; court expressly concerned that law not general,
citing Gronlund v. Salt Lake City).
7. County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 419 P.2d 993
(Wash., 1966) (invalid ordinance regulated only the sale of
furniture, appliances, etc., with exception for sales to nonresidents).
17

8. Nation v. Giant Drug Company, 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo.,
1964) (invalid ordinance regulated retail selling only; court
expressly distinguished from commodity statutes, citing
Broadbent v. Gibson, and was concerned that general closing
not provided for, citing Gronlund v. Salt Lake City).
A heavy majority of the recent State cases that have
considered discrimination arguments related to Sunday
Closing laws have upheld the laws, even though in many cases
the laws were not general. 4 2
Appellants therefore respectfully submit that there is no
legal authority for holding that the subject statute is unreasonably discriminatory.
The Court must nevertheless consider, based upon arguments made in the lower court by Respondents, whether the
Act is unreasonably discriminatory in providing for the exemptions contained therein.
Initially, it has always been recognized that there must
be exceptions to general Sunday Closing legislation. As noted
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the principal 1961
case before the Supreme Court:
In the case of Sunday legislation, an extreme complexity of needs is evident. This is so, first, because
one of the prime objectives of the legislation is preservation of an atmosphere .... Not all activity can halt
on Sunday. Some of the very operations whose
doings must contribute to the rush and clamor of the
42E.g., River Forest v. Vignola, 173 N.E.2d 515 (Ill., 1961); Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky., 1962); Commonwealth v.
Charmberlain, 175 N.E.2d 486 (Mass., 1961); State v. Karmil Merchandising
Corp., 186 A.2d 352 (Me., 1962); People's Appliance & Furniture, Inc. v. Flint,
99 N.W.2d 522 (Mich., 1959); Charles Stores Co., Inc. v. Tucker, 140 S.E. 2d 370
(N .C., 1965); Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunter, 134 S.E. 2d 364 (N .C., 1964);
State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N. Oak., 1966); Opinion of the
Justices, 229 A.2d 188 (N.H., 1967); State v. Monteleone, 175 A.2d 207 (N.J.,
1961); State v. Kidd, 150 N.E.2d 413 (Ohio, 1958); Bertera's Hopewell Food·
land, Inc. v. Masters, 236 A.2d 197 (Pa., 1967); State v. Solomon, 141 S.E.2d 818
(S.C., 1965); Kirk v. Oligiati, 308 S.W.2d 471(Tenn.,1957); Mandell v. Haddon,
121 S.E.2d 516 (Va., 1961); State ex rel. Heck's, Inc. v. Gates, 141 S.E.2d 369
(W.Va., 1965).
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week must go on throughout that day as well, whether hecause life depends upon them, or because the
cost of stopping and restarting is simply too great, or
because to be without their services would be more
disruptive of peace than to have them continue. Many
activities have a double aspect: providing entertainment or recreation for some persons, they entail labor
and workday tedium for others. 4 3
It is of critical importance to keep in mind that mere discrimination is, by itself, meaningless in evaluating constitutionally. It is of little use, therefore, to point out the discrimination in permitting a tavern to sell beer while the grocery store
next door cannot sell orange juice. The test is not whether
discrimination exists, but whether the discrimination that
must exist is without any reasonable basis. Thus, so long as
the exceptions to the Act have a reasonable basis related to
the purposes of the law, there is no constitutional defect. The
objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone for
determining proper and improper classifications. 4 4 It is for
this reason that the exceptions contained in the Act, both
those excluded by definition and those expressly excepted,
are couched in terms of reasons and objectives directly related to the purposes stated in Section 1 of the Act. The
entire purpose of the legislative findings set forth in Section 1
is to establish a factual context and to set forth the general
rationale for the Act, so that it may be clear that the exceptions relate to the general purposes of the legislation.
The essential structure of the exemption provisions is to
set forth categories of exempted activities or commodities as
a matter of definition and purpose. The examples for each
kind of exception are listed only by way of example and not
by way of limitation. Thus, any service or commodity that
fits the type of exemption indicated will be exempt, whether
or not it is specifically included. This feature of the Act
promotes fairness in that the Legislature has made no attempt to determine definitively all the conceivable varieties
products or services that may be, for example, "essential to
travel by persons within or through the State," (Section 5( 3))
43McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420, 524 (1961).
44Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 194 P.2d 464, 466 (1947).
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or "normally associated with or incidental to the operatio11
of recreational, educational or entertainment facilities" (Section 5(4)). The definitional section of the Act (Section 3) has
the effect of exempting certain activities not deemed to be
within the basic purposes of the Act. The exclusions from the
key definition provided in Section 3(2) of the Act meet the
criteria of "works of charity and necessity," a long-established category of exemptions from the application of general
Sunday Closing legislation. The acts of charity and necessity
are more specifically delineated in the Utah Act in order to
avoid the inherent vagueness of such phrases as "works of
charity and necessity" even though that classic phrase was
contained in the Maryland statute upheld in McGowan v.
Maryland. The exceptions contained in Section 5(1) through
5( 4) all arise within the context of the legislative findings set
forth in Section 1. The first three exemptions relate to matters which are vital to the maintenance of basic community
functions and the fourth exception relates to matters which
promote desirable family and social activity and diversion
from weekly labors with a minimum of daily routine performed by those whose facilities must be available to accomplish these purposes. There is, therefore, a rational basis for
the exemptions.
V. THE ACT IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT IS SUBJECT TO LESS STRINGENT TESTS
THAN A CRIMINAL STATUTE, ITS ARGUABLY AMBIGUOUS PHRASES HAVE BEEN UPHELD BY OTHER
COURTS, AND NONE OF THE PHRASES STRUCK DOWN
BY OTHER COURTS IS CONTAINED IN THE ACT.
A. The Act is subject to less stringent tests. The Act is
not a criminal statute, and may be enforced only through the
civil remedy of injunctive relief. For this reason, although the
statute should be reasonably intelligible, it is not subject to
the "void-for-vagueness" test commonly applied to criminal
statutes.
The theoretical basis for the vagueness doctrine is found
in the principle of legality under due process that no person
should be subjected to crime or punishment except by a
fixed, predetermined law. A significant distinction has de-
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veloped during the past three decades, particularly in the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, between "life and liberty" on the one hand and "property" on the other. As has
been stated in a leading treatment of the subject, "since the
advent of the New Deal Court, ... there has been l only) one
economic vagueness case, and with the ever-increasing
emphasis upon protection of first amendment liberties, free
speech vagueness cases have begun to proliferate. 4 5
The distinction between criminal and non-criminal statutes has also been consistently recognized in the decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court. A good example of the distinction
may be found in comparing the Court's two opinions in the
case of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp. 4 6 The question in both cases was whether the employment of a sixteenyear-old boy under certain circumstances was "dangerous or
prejudicial to the life, health, safety or welfare" of a minor.
The court construed the phrase according to normal statutory construction methods in the first case in concluding that
the employment of the deceased minor had been within the
meaning of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. However, on petition for rehearing, when criminal implications
had been brought to the Court's attention, Justice Wolfe,
writing for the majority, stated that a different standard
would apply in construing the word "dangerous". After
noting that "penal statutes, to be constitutional, must be
clear and definite in their terms so that there may be known
exactly what conduct is proscribed," he stated:
[A]n employer should not be subject to criminal sanctions for employing a minor in his place of business,
where reasonable minds might differ as to whether
such place of business were dangerous within the
meaning of the act .... It is difficult to see how an
employer would know . . whether he were guilty of
a criminal offense .... 4 7
The distinction was also expressly recognized in Kent Club v.
Toronto: 48
45 Amsterdam. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67. 74 N. 38 (1960).
46196 P.2d 487 (Utah, 1948) and 202 P.2d 727 (Utah, 1949).
47rd. at 729
48305 P.2d 870, 873-74 (Utah, 1957).
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Legislation should not be judicially declared invalid
on the ground that it is unintelligible or uncertain
unless it is so imperfect and deficient as to render it
susceptible of no reasonable construction that will
give it effect, or the court finds itself unable to define
the purpose and intent of the legislature .... [I] t is
important to keep in mind that it [the Act under
consideration] pertains to the issuance and regulation
of such charters and is not a criminal statute involving
the sanctions of punishment for crime for failure to
comply with its provisions.
The legislature's decision to make the Utah Common
Day of Rest Act a civil statute was based primarily upon this
civil-criminal distinction, for reasons best set forth by the
memorandum accompanying the proposed model Common
Day of Rest Act in the Harvard Journal on Legislation:
The provision for injunctive relief in this type of statute has much to recommend it. A statute establishing
a common day of rest with exemptions for specified
classes of persons and businesses can hardly be as
precise as one would like a statute, especially a criminal statute, to be. A scheme of injunctive relief provides a clear warning to any violator that his behavior
does in fact violate the statue, and that he is not
entitled to claim any of the exemptions. The warning
is given when the injunction is issued and no penalty
is immediately imposed. The statute still has teeth,
for the injunction, once issued, can be enforced under
the contempt powers of a court of equity. Most
people would probably comply voluntarily with the
statute, and the fear of becoming involved in an injunction proceeding and of being enjoined would
deter others. Individual violations of this type of statute are not very significant as long as the statute is
generally observed, thus correction of the initial offense by means of an injunction against further violation rather than by means of punishment would not
seem to detract from the efficacy of the statute ....
It is noteworthy in this connection that the public
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accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides for enforcement only by civil actions for
injunctions and not by any criminal penalties. It
should be easier for the state to obtain an injunction
than to secure a criminal conviction because in the
former situation the burden of proof is lighter and
the case is tried to a judge sitting in equity. Omission
of the criminal penalty provisions will avoid subjecting the statute to the burden of strict construction that a penal statute must bear; it will also avoid
the problem of vagueness which the due process
clause presents where a criminal statute is involved
.... Furthermore, since there are undoubtedly some
cases in which it will not be completely clear that the
statute applies, the criminal penalty may sometimes
be unfair. 49
Thus, the Utah law is significantly less vulnerable to a
claim for void-for-vagueness than if it had criminal penalties.
There are obvious difficulties in reaching unanimity of opinion concerning the definition of words or phrases in any
statute and judicial interpretations of the Act may be necessary from time to time; however, that is hardly a basis for
declaring any statute void. As stated in United States v.
Petrillo, the fact that
there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to
determine the side of the line on which a particular
fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the
language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. 5 0
Moreover, as Mr. Justice Holmes stated in rejecting a claim of
vagueness by one charged with a criminal violation under the
Sherman Act:
[T] he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If
493 Harvard Journal on Legjslation 345, 355-56 (1965-66).
50332 U.S. 1, 7.
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his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine
or a short imprisionment ... ; he may incur the
penalty of death. 51
B. Under Utah case law, civil statutes have been found
unconstitutionally vague only under highly extreme circumstances. According to the existing cases, a non-criminal Utah
statute will be found unconstitutionally vauge only if it is
literally impossible to construe the statute to have any
meaning. In the leading case on the subject, Norville v. State
Tax Commission, 5 2 Justice Wolfe enunciated several important guidelines, some of which are set forth as follows:
Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are presumed
to be constitutional and valid ....
When there is ambiguity in the terms of a statute or
when it is susceptible to two interpretations, one of
which would render it unconstitutional and the other
bring it within constitutional sanctions, the court is
bound to choose that interpretation which would uphold the statute, and to pronounce a statute unconstitutional only when the case is so clear as to be free
from doubt ....
The duty of this court in construing and interpreting
legislative acts is to give effect to the intention of the
legislature .... [T] he intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consummate with reason
and good discretion ....
We may then look to the reason of the enactment and
inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect, in
accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if
necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.
In more recent cases, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated
this standard:
51Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
5297 P.2d 937 (Utah, 1940).

24

It is the duty of courts to interpret and construe
statutes, and only where the statute is so vague that
the meaning of the legislature cannot be ascertained
or understood therefrom will they refuse to enforce
an act. They will not substitute what they think
ought to be the law for ambiguous terms in the act,
nor will they declare an act invalid because it has not
been expressed as aptly or clearly as it could have
been had different terms been used. Instead the
courts will use every authorized means to discover
and give an Act an intelligible meaning. Only when it
is impossible to resolve the doubts will an Act be
declared invalid for uncertainty or vagueness. 5 3

The statute should not be stricken down nor applied
other than in accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or confused as to be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, or it contravenes some
basic constitutional right. If it meets these tests, it is
not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom, or
its effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or orderliness of the procedure set forth, but it has a duty to
let it operate as the legislature has provided. 5 4
It would appear from the language of these tests that a
non-criminal statute cannot be considered unconstitutionally
vauge so long as it contains any standard for construing a
rational meaning. Of the 14 cases located by Appellants in
which the Utah Supreme Court has considered a claim of
vagueness in connection with a non-criminal statute, only
two statutes have been found so unintelligible as to be

53Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127, 131(Utah,1950) (emphasis
added).
54Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451(Utah,1967).
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meaningless. 5 5 In the first of these cases, the Court was unable to define the term "environs" in construing "the Great
Salt Lake and its environs" in attempting to determine the
jurisdiction of the Great Salt Lake Authority. In the second
case, the statute did not contain any basis for apportioning
amounts to be charged various funds for salaries of the Land
Board; hence, it was considered inoperable. Note that both of
these cases relate to the authority of governmental agencies,
an historical area of concern to the Utah Court which is not
present in the subject statute.
It is respectfully submitted that the Utah Act under
consideration does contain standards for determining the
meaning of its terms. These standards are created by setting
forth categories of exemptions that tie into the specified purposes of the act, followed by examples of each category. This
approach is very similar to that upheld in the Mary land statute by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Another question presented by appellants is whether
Article 27, Section 509, which exempts the Sunday
retail sale of merchandise essential to, or customarily
sold at, or incidental to, the operation of bathing
beaches, amusement parks, etc., in Anne Arundel
County, is unconstitutionally vauge. We believe that
business people of ordinary intelligence in the position of appellants' employer would be able to know
what exceptions are encompassed by the statute
either as a matter of ordinary commercial knowledge
or by simply making a reasonable investigation at a
nearby bathing beach or amusement park within the
55The cases upholding the statutes involved are Gord v. Salt Lake City,
434 P.2d 449 (Utah, 1967); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission,
426 P.2d 231 (Utah, 1967); Peay v. Board of Education of Provo City School
District, 377 P.2d 490 (Utah, 1962); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756
(Utah, 1962); State v. Guerts, 359 P.2d 12 (Utah, 1961); Merkley v. State Tax
Commission, 358 P.2d 991 (Utah, 1961); Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 P.2d 870
(Utah, 1957); Tygeson v. Magna Water Company, 226 P.2d 127 (Utah, 1950);
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, 196 P.2d 487 (Utah, 1948);
Nowers v. Oakden, 169 P.2d 108 (Utah, 1946); Norville v. State Tax Commission,
97 P.2d 937 (Utah, 1940); McDonald v. Price, 146 Pac. 550 (Utah, 1915). The
two cases in which the statutes were found unconstitutionally vague were Great
Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Company, 421 P.2d 504 (Utah, 1966) and
Dern v. Holden, 256 Pac. 537 (Utah, 1927).
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county .... Under these circumstances, there is no
necessity to guess at the statute's meaning in order to
determine what conduct makes it criminal. McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (196l)(emphasis added).
The language of the Utah Act is covered directly by this
statement from Mr. Chief Justice Warren, even though the
Maryland statute contained criminal penalties.
C. Many phrases similar to those being challenged as
unconstitutionally vague in the Utah Act have been upheld
by numerous state courts. The Utah Common Day of Rest
Act appears to be the only state Sunday Closing statute that
does not contain criminal penalties. Even with that fact in
mind, it is significant to note that a heavy majority of the
state supreme courts which have considered charges of unconstitutional vagueness in connection with Sunday closing
statutes since 1960 have found the statutes valid. These cases
are cited below, with occasional parenthetical references to
particular phrases contained in the statutes that were challenged:

1. State v. Morais, 199 A.2d 351 (Conn., 1963) ("or
other public diversion").
2. Berta v. Georgia,
("works of necessity").

154

S.E.2d 594 (Ga., 1967)

3. Arlan's Department Store v. State, 369 S.W.2d 9
(Ky., 1963) ("works of necessity").
4. State v. Deutch, 161 So.2d 730 (La., 1964).
5. State v. Karmil Merchandising Corp., 186 A.2d 352
(Me., 1962)("gifts").
6. Mark's Furs v. City of Detroit, 112 N.W.2d 66
(Mich., 1961).
7. Charles Stores Co., v. Tucker, 140 S.E.2d 370 (N.C.,
1965) ("household appliances", "hardware").
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8. Opinion of the Justices, 229 A.2d 188 (N .H., 1967)
("necessity", "emergency", "charity").
9. Fass v. Roos, 221 F.Supp. 448 (D.C.N.J., 1963).
10. State v. Corn, 177 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio, 1960 ("travelling or the providing of services and commodities incidental
thereto," "recreation ... entertainment or services and commodities incidental thereto").
11. Bertera's Hopewell Foodland v. Masters, 236 A.2d
197 (Pa., 1967) ("food prepared on the premises for human
consumption").
12. State v. Solomon, 141 S.E.2d 818 (S.C., 1965)
"works of necessity", "necessity", "novelties, souvenirs").
13. Texas v. Spartan's Industries, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407
(Tex., 1969).
14. State v. Gates, 141 S.E.2d 369 (W.Va., 1965) ("sale
of commodities and services customarily furnished at garages
and service stations", "processing of natural resources",
"food for human consumption", "isolated transactions",
"unexpected emergency", "works of necessity or charity").
Some of these cases are collected in an annotation
dealing with the validity of Sunday laws or ordinances as
affected by vagueness or uncertainty. 5 6 That annotation follows a reprinting of one of the four cases that have been
found unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness since the
1961 Supreme Court cases. The case is State v. Hill 57 which
found too vague the phrase: "articles of immediate necessity," although the word "provisions" was acceptable to the
court. There was no apparent standard, by way of examples
or otherwise, for determining the meaning of the phrase
found objectionable by the Court. This same phrase was
found unconstitutionally vague by the Missouri Supreme
Court, 5 8 although a statute passed by the Missouri Legisla5691 A.L.R.2d 763.
57 369.P. 2d 365 (Kans., 1962).
58ttarvey v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324 (Mo., 1963).
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ture following this decision which contained the phrases
"novelties and souvenirs" and "housewares" was upheld in a
later Missouri case. 5 9 A third statute was found unconstitutionally vague in North Carolina which contained the phrase
"articles necessary for making repairs and performing services". 6 0 The Court distinguished the language quoted above
from McGowan v. Maryland by indicating that the North
Carolina statute contained no standard for determining what
articles might conceivably be necessary for making repairs
and performing services. The North Carolina court also suggested an additional reason for its decision by expressing disapproval of the failure of the statute to prohibit all business
rather than simply limiting retail selling. That this factor influenced the Court was made clear in a later case which upheld a new North Carolina statute which included such
phrases as "household appliances", and "hardware". 61
The only other case to find a Sunday Closing statute
unconstitutionally vague was in Minnesota, where the court
drew a sharp distinction between civil and criminal statutes :6 2
Statutes punishing conduct inherently anti-social,
dangerous or immoral in character necessarily must
and can be framed in broad terms. But where a statute imposes penal sanctions for specific acts not of
such character, more specific definition and clarity is
demanded. 6 3
The Minnesota court was confronted with a number of vagueness problems, including the relationship of several state statutes to each other and the question whether the act affected
retail as well as wholesale selling. It was a combination of
ambiguities which troubled the court. It is worthy of note
that the Minnesota court directed the legislature's attention
to the proposed model Common Day of Rest Act referred to
earlier in this memorandum, after which several significant
features of the Utah Act are patterned, as "a more constitutionally permissible statute. " 6 5
5Hstate v. McQueen, 378 S.W.2d 449 (Mo., 1964).
60G.l. Surplus Store v. Hunter, 125 S.E.2d 764 (N .C., 1962).
61Charles Stores Co. v. Tucker, 140 S.E.2d 370 (N.C., 1965).
62state v. Target Stores, Inc., 156 N.W.2d 908 (Minn., 1968).
631ct. at 924.
651ct. at 912 N. 16.
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It should be apparent to the Court that there is little if
any legal authority for finding the subject Utah Common
Day of Rest Act unconstitutionally vague. This would likely
be the case even if the statute contained criminal penalties,
since none of the phrases found unconstitutionally vague by
other state courts appear in the Utah statute. In addition, the
Utah statute contains standards by which any uncertain
terms may be interpreted or defined, as mentioned by Chief
Justice Warren in the McGowan case. The absence of standards appears to be common to the only state cases that have
found Sunday Closing legislation unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that the order of the lower court
should be reversed and the cases remanded on the ground
that the Act is constitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX

BRUCE C. HAFEN
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